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ABSTRACT
Today the cloud plays a central role in storing, processing, and
distributing data. Despite contributing to the rapid development of
IoT applications, the current IoT cloud-centric architecture has led
into a myriad of isolated data silos that hinders the full potential
of holistic data-driven analytics within the IoT. In this paper, we
present a blockchain-based design for the IoT that brings a dis-
tributed access control and data management. We depart from the
current trust model that delegates access control of our data to a
centralized trusted authority and instead empower the users with
data ownership. Our design is tailored for IoT data streams and
enables secure data sharing. We enable a secure and resilient access
control management, by utilizing the blockchain as an auditable
and distributed access control layer to the storage layer. We facili-
tate the storage of time-series IoT data at the edge of the network
via a locality-aware decentralized storage system that is managed
with the blockchain technology. Our system is agnostic of the phys-
ical storage nodes and supports as well utilization of cloud storage
resources as storage nodes.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of networked embedded devices dubbed as
the IoT, we are witnessing an ever increasing number of innovative
applications. The current ecosystem of the IoT consists typically
of designated low-power devices equipped with sensors collect-
ing data. This data is then stored via special-purpose apps (i.e.,
application-layer gateways) in a third-party cloud storage for fur-
ther processing.
This stove-piped architecture [31] has resulted into isolated data
silos, where users have limited control over their data and how
it is used. Users have to trust the cloud and application providers
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Figure 1: Our blockchain-based, end-to-end encrypted, and
decentralized data storage. No central trusted authority con-
trols access to users’ data.
and have no choice but to rely on their promises of security and
availability.
Today’s IoT security efforts mostly focus on securing point-to-
point communication and fall short in addressing security during
the life-cycle of data (e.g., auditable access control, secure sharing).
The current cloud-based model in the IoT handles identification, au-
thentication, and connectivity of IoT devices. Although this model
has enabled the bootstrap of the IoT ecosystem, it is not necessarily
the most suitable solution for the IoT [32], as it neglects the locality
of data and mandates centralization through trusted third parties.
These limitations necessitate a rethinking of the way we cur-
rently handle IoT data. Instead of giving up ownership of our data
to various applications, we enable an independent and resilient data
management system that ensures data ownership. We identify the
following requirements for such a system: (R1) Decentralized, re-
silient, and auditable access control management (ownership, cryp-
tographically secure sharing); (R2) Secure data storage (confiden-
tiality, authenticity, integrity); (R3) IoT compatibility (append-only
data streams, with a single writer and several readers). Conven-
tional cloud-based solutions provide R2 and when relevant R3, but
fall short in addressing R1. Recent decentralized storage startup
efforts (Sia [25], Storj [29], Filecoin [27]) show the potential of
decentralized blockchain-based storage with financial incentives.
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These efforts, however, are optimized for file storage and fall short
in accommodating for time-series data of the IoT (i.e., R3).
We propose a blockchain-based access control management to
address R1. This provides us with an independent network that
maintains a distributed ledger of access control permissions. In-
spired by recent blockchain-based technologies [2, 33], we combine
the blockchain with an off-chain storage, for a scalable secure data
storage to address R2. Finally, our system is designed from the
ground up to support IoT data streams to address R3. Our system
accommodates for IoT data streams where streams are chunked,
compressed, and encrypted in the application layer and only au-
thorized services are granted access to the decryption keys. This
requires us to address several challenges for an efficient key dis-
tribution and management scheme as well as a secure storage of
data stream chunks. The built-in cryptocurrency feature in the
underlying blockchain technology would allow the realization of
an autonomous, self-sustaining decentralized storage ecosystem,
where storage nodes are rewarded for providing storage and band-
width, and more importantly for following the protocol correctly.
The contribution of this paper is the design of a novel blockchain-
based auditable data-management system for IoT data. Our system
exhibits (i) a cryptographically secure data sharing with frequent
key updates, (ii) the possibility of access revocation, (iii) an efficient
search of compressed chunked data streams, and (iv) a distributed
locality-aware storage layer.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review important aspects of the cloud,
the IoT ecosystem, and give a primer on the blockchain technology.
2.1 Cloud
Cloud platforms are typically hosted in large-scale data centers
that are located at the edge of the Internet backbone [32]. The
consolidation and centralization of data centers, however, yield
an increased distance between clients and services. This results
in a high variability in latency and bandwidth. To address this is-
sue, especially with regards to resource-intensive and interactive
applications, decentralized cloud architectures, namely cloudlets,
have emerged. Cloudlets are small-scale data centers that are lo-
cated closer to users and can meet low latency and high bandwidth
guarantees. Our system embraces this locality-aware data storage
and processing trend and brings it to its full potential with our
decentralized access control layer which ensures ownership and
secure sharing of data.
2.2 IoT Ecosystem
Embedded computing devices are increasingly integrated into ob-
jects and environments surrounding us. These devices utilize low-
cost sensors for a range of applications. The typical system structure
of the IoT involves the three tiers of (i) low-power IoT devices, (ii) a
potential gateway that interconnects IoT devices with the Internet,
and (iii) the backend where IoT data is stored.
IoT devices are typically equipped with resources in the orders
of few MHz of CPU, few 10s of KB of RAM, and few 100s of KB of
ROM. Additionally, they can embed low-power hardware crypto
accelerators, enabling a new class of secure applications [23, 24],
for instance, lightweight clients of a blockchain network. How-
ever, conventional security solutions for the IoT still utilize pre-
shared symmetric keys for the secure communication. This simple
approach does not scale for the massive number of IoT devices.
Efforts [14] to tailor public-key based secure communication to the
IoT remain to find widespread adoption. Leveraging the blockchain
technology, we enable a decentralized management of identities of
IoT devices and enable a transparent device ownership.
2.3 Blockchain
A blockchain is essentially a distributed ledger that consists of
a continuously growing set of records. The distributed nature of
blockchains implies no single entity controls the ledger (i.e., cen-
sorship/suppression resistant), but rather the participating peers
together validate the authenticity of records. These records are
organized in blocks which are linked together using cryptographic
hashes, hence the name blockchain. Blockchain-based technolo-
gies [19] incentivize a network of peers to make computations
towards consensus in the network.
The most prominent example of a successful blockchain deploy-
ment is the Bitcoin cryptocurrency (the decentralized peer-to-peer
digital currency) [6, 18]. The Bitcoin blockchain maintains all trans-
actions from the initial block, referred to as the genesis block. A
transaction contains the sender, receiver, amount of the transferred
Bitcoin currency, and signature of the sender. For a transaction to
be included in the blockchain (i.e., to be considered as valid), it is
transmitted to the blockchain network. The so-called miners take
the responsibility to verify new transactions and suggest the next
block which includes the verified transactions. Miners are rewarded
with Bitcoins and transaction fees for their computational work.
To prevent a single miner from dominating the blockchain net-
work and hence having the power of manipulating the history
of transactions, the concept of proof-of-work [18] is employed to
reach consensus in the blockchain network. A new block includes a
set of new transactions, the hash of the previous block, the miner’s
address who is suggesting this block, and most importantly the an-
swer to a difficult-to-solve mathematical puzzle. This mathematical
puzzle is unique to each block and easy to verify once found. Once
a miner finds such a block, it publishes it such that all nodes and
miners can verify its correctness and consider it as the new valid
block to build upon. In case several valid blocks are suggested at
the same time, miners randomly select the next block. Eventually,
the network converges towards the longest branch of the block-
chain as the main branch. Solving the puzzle is referred to as the
proof-of-work and ensures as well resistance against Sybil attacks.
Bitcoin and its most prominent contender Ethereum [1] are
permission-less blockchains where any node can become a miner or
just a client. Permissioned blockchains, such as the hyperledger [7],
allow a designated set of authorized validator nodes (i.e., miners)
to participate in the block validation process. Such blockchains
typically use more CPU-friendly consensus protocols, such as the
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol [8], since the set
of validator nodes is known. Hence, permissioned blockchains
can handle a higher transaction throughput (7 vs. 104 transac-
tions per second). However, permissioned blockchains require a
trusted central party to initially authorize the blockchain validators.
Networks are composed of three basic components
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Figure 2: Overviewof our layered design. Transactions in the
blockchain can contain access permissions (gray).
Moreover, due to the high communication overhead, i.e., O(n2),
only deployments of a few tens of validators are practical.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In a nutshell, we decouple the control and data plane of our IoT
distributed storage system (see Fig. 2). We realize the access con-
trol layer using a public blockchain, to satisfy R1. Bitcoin is our
current candidate for the blockchain layer in our reference im-
plementation due to its strong security, reliability, and current
dominance. However, other cryptocurrencies [22] can be employed
seamlessly. This is possible, because our system’s logic resides in a
virtualchain [2, 21] and outside the blockchain. Virtualchain allows
the introduction of new functionality to production blockchains,
without requiring any changes in the underlying blockchain.
The data plane consists of a routing layer and the secure stor-
age layer to satisfy R2. The storage layer is composed of either an
on-premises storage, the cloud, or a distributed peer-to-peer net-
work. Data is encrypted end-to-end at the client-side. Hence, the
storage nodes have no insights about the hosted data at their side.
The data in our system is structured in streams, to accommodate
for IoT-specific needs (statisfies R3). In concrete terms, ownership
and sharing permissions are per stream, and streams are chunked
and encrypted before storage.
In the following, we detail our design for the control plane and
our data plane features.
3.1 Control Plane
In our system, the control plane is logically separated and agnostic
of the data plane.
Blockchain. We employ a publicly verifiable blockchain to cre-
ate an accountable distributed system and bootstrap trust in an
untrusted network, without a central trust entity. In our system,
transactions consist of ownership of data streams and correspond-
ing access permissions. Our access control transactions, similar
to default transactions of the underlying cryptocurrency, remain
publicly auditable (see Fig. 2). To preserve the privacy of access
permissions, we can rely on stealth addresses [9].
Access Control. Weuse the blockchain to store access permissions
securely. Access rights are granted per data stream and the data
owner can revoke the sharing of a data stream. Initially, the data
owner issues a transaction including the stream identifier (i.e., hash
digest). To share the data stream with a service, the data owner
issues a new transaction which holds (i) the stream identifier and
(ii) the public key address of the service.
For any request to retrieve data, the storage node first checks
the blockchain for access rights. Note that a malicious storage node
could hand out data without permission. However, the impact of
this action is limited since (i) data is encrypted, (ii) in the case of
DHT, each node holds a small random fraction of a data stream.
Moreover, economic incentives (i.e., collateral and reward) should
encourage storage nodes to follow the protocol correctly.
Key Management. We enable a low-cost key renewal with key
regression [12]. In key regression, given key Kt in current time
t one can compute all keys until the initial key K0. This allows
us to update the encryption keys frequently, and only share the
latest Kt with the sharing services. However, given n services, this
requires a communication overhead in the order of O(n): at each
key update, the key must be shared n times (after encrypting it with
the corresponding service’s public key).
We propose to employ a re-encryption-based technique to bring
the communication overhead to O(1). Given a re-encryption token
Ta→b , one can re-encrypt a ciphertext under Alice’s public key
PKa to a ciphertext under Bob’s public key PKb , without access to
the plaintext [3, 5]. To share Kt with all services, Alice encrypts Kt
with a one-time public key pair (PKa , SKa ). For all services Si , she
issues a re-encryption tokenTSKa→PKSi based on their public keys
PKSi (this step takes place while issuing the sharing transaction).
Each service Si can then re-encrypt ENCPKa (Kt ) to ENCPKSi (Kt ),
and use their respective secret keys (SKSi ) to access Kt . After this
point, Alice only needs to update ENCPKa (Kt+1) for the services
to preserve their access to the latest key Kt+1.
Revocation. To revoke access to a data stream, the data owner
updates the encryption key toKt+1. She then updates the encrypted
shared key for authorized readers, however, with a new one-time
public key pair: ENCPKa′ (Kt+1). Revocation causes a communi-
cation overhead of O(n), since Alice needs to update all valid re-
encryption tokensTSKa′→PKSi , excluding the revoked service. This
prevents the revoked user to decrypt any future data.
As an additional protection, and for auditing purposes, the user
issues a new blockchain transaction overriding previous permis-
sions. Storage nodes will even decline sharing older data, that the
user once had access to. The impact of a potential dishonest node
leaking old encrypted data chunks is low, as old data might have
been cached at the user anyway. New data, however, is protected
cryptographically after a key update.
3.2 Data Plane
In order to address R3, we consider IoT data types of stream char-
acter where data records are generated continuously, as depicted
in Fig. 3. Current distributed storage approaches [15, 27, 29] pri-
marily target archiving data and are not suitable for IoT data.
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Figure 3: Data streams are chunked at pre-defined lengths,
compressed, and encrypted. To lookup a record, a local index
maps the key of the record to the chunk key.
Moreover, they either consider data to be public (e.g., IPFS[15]) or
store encrypted datawithout a secure sharing feature (e.g., Storj [29]
and Filecoin [27]).
To store time-series data in our system, we store data chunks
which compose several consecutive data records, instead of storing
individual data records. To this end, we split a data stream into
data chunks which are cryptographically chained together (i.e.,
each chunk holds a hash pointer to the previous chunk). Although
chunking data prevents random access at the record level, there is
a positive gain on the performance of data retrieval since in time-
series data most queries require data that is co-located in time (e.g.,
all records of one day) [13].
Note that the data itself is stored off-chain and only its iden-
tifier (i.e., hash pointer) is included in the blockchain, ensuring
data immutability. Since adding an identifier for each chunk to the
blockchain would not scale, our system adds only data chunks at
given intervals into the blockchain. Due to the fact that all chunks
are cryptographically chained together, all chunks that are between
two intervals without their identifier in the blockchain become
immutable too. The interval-time corresponds to the maximum
time chunks need to become immutable. It is tunable and defined
by the application logic.
Encryption. Each data chunk is encrypted at the source with an ef-
ficient symmetric cipher. We rely on AES-GCM, as an authenticated
encryption scheme. Our chunks have a plaintext field containing
the key value of the chunk and the encrypted compressed data
records. With authenticated encryption, both fields are integrity
protected and authenticated. Services with access to the symmet-
ric data stream key Kt can verify the integrity of the chunk and
perform an authenticated decryption.
To ensure data ownership, for instance towards the storage layer,
each chunk is in addition signed. This allows parties without access
to the stream key to still be able to verify the owner of the data
stream, albeit at a higher computation cost. Each chunk contains
the unencrypted stream identifier linking it to the corresponding
access control transactions.
Compression. IoT data is highly compressible due to high corre-
lation in time. Hence, we compress data chunks before encryption.
This reduces bandwidth and storage requirements significantly.
Our initial results of IoT data compression show that even with
small chunk sizes, we can reach compression ratios close to the
optimum (i.e., compression of the entire data set). As depicted in
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Figure 4: Compression ratio of our chunking with the
authors Fitbit data and anonymized Ava data of one year.
Hence, the IoT gateway serves as a cache of recent data
items for on the gateway hosted apps and could as well
be queried by services in network proximity to the IoT
gateway. Current IoT apps, first push all new data to the
cloud and then fetch them again for visualization (e.g.,
FitBit), introducing an unnecessary latency.
For the distributed storage, we rely on a P2P overlay
routing technique and a Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
as our general-purpose private key-value data store inter-
face. The DHT serves as a scalable, self-managing stor-
age with high availability (i.e., robust against targeted
communication outages or malicious attacks in case of
central servers). The DHT in general enforces repli-
cated and randomized storage across a 256-bit address
space. However, we rely on the sloppy hashing tech-
nique [12,13] to augment our instantiation of DHT [5,20]
with locality. To this end, chunks are stored/replicated on
nodes that are closer to the services or the data owner.
How to financially incentivize participation in a dis-
tributed storage is out of the scope of this paper. Sev-
eral researchers and a few start-ups propose systems
where users can make money with “renting out” their
local storage space [28–30]. For instance, proof-of-
retrievability [30] can be used as a mechanism to reward
users who store more files for a longer time.
3.3 Privacy & Security Analysis.
For an adversary to alter access permissions in the block-
chain it requires forging a digital-signature or gaining
control over the majority of the compute power in the
blockchain network. The former is prevented with the
security of signatures and the latter with the consensus
protocol in the blockchain (i.e., proof-of-work) and its
decentralized nature. Moreover, an adversary is not ca-
pable of learning sensitive information from the pub-
lic blockchain, since only pseudo-identities and stream
identifiers are stored there. Data chunks are encrypted,
integrity protected, and authenticated. An adversary with
access to encryption key cannot alter stored chunks, as it
requires gaining access to the public-private key pair of
the data owner.
4 Related Work
In this section, we briefly review a subset of relevant
work to our system.
Data Privacy & Access Control. The current dom-
inating approach for sharing data in the web services
is based on the OAuth protocol [19] where a central
trusted entity enforces user-defined access policies (does
not fullfil R1). Sieve [31] addresses these shortcomings
with a combination of key-homomorphic and attribute-
based encryption schemes. Many applications employ
anonymized data collection [27] as an attempt to pro-
tect personally identifiable information. However, re-
searchers have demonstrated effective de-anonymization
techniques [23] which work even with a small set of high
dimensionality data.
Blockchain. In recent years, a new class of blockchain
technologies have emerged that utilize the accountable
computing and auditability of blockchains for other do-
mains. Blockstack [1] introduces the concept of virtu-
alchains and proposes a decentralized server-less DNS.
Blockstack extends to a decentralized public key distri-
bution system and registry for user identities. Storj [30]
and FileCoin [28] introduce a distributed object storage.
They are both targeted for archiving files and lack shar-
ing features. Enigma [34, 35] is the closest to our ap-
proach in that it uses the blockchain for access control
and enables sharing of off-chain stored data. However,
Enigma stores data access logs within the blockchain,
without addressing the consequential scalability issues.
Moreover, their system does not accommodate for IoT
stream data (not satisfing R3). Our approach is inspired
by the above approaches, however, our focus on IoT data
leads to a number of important design differences.
IoT Storage. A few of our design decisions regarding
IoT data streams are inspired by Bolt [16]. Bolt presents
chunking of IoT data for performance gain and protects
confidentiality of chunks. However, Bolt relies on the
cloud-centric model (does not address R1). “The Cloud
is Not Enough” [33] discusses the pitfalls of the cloud-
centric IoT and advocates a data-centric approach. They
leave concrete system proposals for future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the primary design of a dis-
tributed secure data storage system targeted for the Inter-
net of Things. Our system allows for fine-grained access
control and sharing of sensor data of various IoT appli-
cations. Realizing such a system requires addressing re-
search challenges at several fronts. We are currently in
the process of finalizing our design and implementing a
complete prototype of our system and building several
IoT applications on top of it.
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thors Fitbit data and anonymized Ava data of one year.
Fig. 4, compressing the data record of one year by Fitbit1 results into
a compression ratio of 9.75 (11.45 for Ava2 ). Alr ady with a chunk
size of 2048 (corr sponding to ne day worth of data records for
Ava), we can reach a ratio of 11.08 for encrypted and compressed
chunks.
Search. In the storage layer, we store key-value pairs. In our case,
the value is the current data chunk of a data stream, where the
key (i.e., a 256-bit identifier) is the cryptographic hash of the tuple:
<stream-ID, owner-ID, timestamp-hash>. The IDs are unique bit
strings (i.e., hash digests).
To enable an efficient search and query of any record in the data
stream, we use a simple technique based on the the timestamp t0 of
the first chunk and the length of the chunks ∆. To look-up a record
with timestamp ti , we compu e the timestamp of the chunk holding
it. For instance, the look-up of value 6 in Fig. 3 is mapped to the
key of chunk #1.
Data Storage. We advocate a distributed data storage layer, how-
ever our design is agnostic of the storage layer. Hence, on-premise
storage and storage on cloud services are compatible with our sys-
tem.
The IoT gateway serves as an intermediate storage node at the
front of the storage layer. The gateway can push the chunks in a
FIFO principle into the storage layer to maintain a reasonable local
storage size. Hence, the IoT gateway serves as a cache of recent data
items for on the gateway hosted apps and c uld as well b queried
by services in network proximity to the IoT gateway. Current IoT
apps, first push all new data to the cloud and then fetch them again
for presentation (e.g., FitBit), introducing an unnecessary latency.
For the distributed storage, we rely on a P2P overlay routing tech-
nique and a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) as our general-purpose
private key-value data store interface. The DHT serves as a scalable,
self-managing storage with high availability (i.e., robust against tar-
geted communication outages or malicious attacks in case of central
servers). The DHT in general enforces replicated and randomized
storage across a 160-bit address space. However, we rely on the
sloppy hashing technique [10, 11] to augment our instantiation of
DHT [4, 17] with locality. To this end, chunks are stored/replicated
on nodes that are closer to the services or the data owner.
How to financially incentivize participation in a distributed stor-
age is out of the scope f his paper. Several r search s and a
few start-ups propose systems where users can make money with
“renting out" their local storage space [27–29]. For instance, proof-
of-retrievability [29] can be used as a mechanism to reward users
1 Fitbit heart rate & fitness wirstband: www.fitbit.com/charge2
2 Ava: ovulation tracking bracelet: www.avawomen.com
who store more files for a longer time. Moreover, the reward en-
courages storage nodes to follow the protocol correctly, for example
with regards to enforcing the access permissions.
3.3 Privacy & Security Analysis
For an adversary to alter access permissions in the blockchain it
requires forging a digital signature or gaining control over the
majority of the compute power in the blockchain network. The
former is prevented with the security of signatures and the latter
with the consensus protocol in the blockchain (i.e., proof-of-work)
and its decentralized nature. Moreover, an adversary is not capable
of learning sensitive information from the public blockchain, since
only pseudo-identities and stream identifiers are stored there. Data
chunks are encrypted, integrity protected, and authenticated. An
adversarywith access to encryption keys cannot alter stored chunks,
as it requires gaining access to the public-private key pair of the
data owner. Even in case the owner’s key is leaked, chunks cannot
be modified due to the blockchain immutability (except for chunks
in the current interval). Rational storage nodes follow the protocol
correctly due to financial incentives (i.e., interplay of reward and
collateral)
3.4 Primary Evaluation
Initial evaluation results from our reference implementation in the
bitcoin blockchain (i.e., bitcoin testnet) show reasonable overhead.
For instance, augmenting Amazon’s S3 storage with our system’s
access control results only in a slowdown of 10% in request through-
put. In comparison, a distributed storage with more than 1000 nodes
experiences a factor of 2 slowdown, dominated by the routing. This
slowdown is the worst-case scenario with no locality-awareness in
storage of data. Store and get procedures for individual chunks re-
quire 150 ms, assuming no local caching. We are currently working
on thoroughly evaluating our system and analyzing the perfor-
mance of several real-world IoT applications on top of it.
4 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly review a subset of relevant work to our
system.
Data Privacy & Access Control. The current dominating ap-
proach for sharing data in the web services is based on the OAuth
protocol [16] where a central trusted entity enforces user-defined
access policies (does not fullfil R1). Sieve [30] addresses these short-
comings with a combination of key-homomorphic and attribute-
based encryption schemes. Many applications employ anonymized
data collection [26] as an attempt to protect personally identifiable
information. However, researchers have demonstrated effective de-
anonymization techniques [20] which work even with a small set
of high dimensionality data.
Blockchain. In recent years, a new class of blockchain technolo-
gies have emerged that utilize the accountable computing and au-
ditability of blockchains for other domains. Blockstack [2] intro-
duces the concept of virtualchains and proposes a decentralized
server-less DNS. Blockstack extends to a decentralized public key
distribution system and registry for user identities. Storj [29] and
FileCoin [27] (secure successor of IPFS [15]) introduce a distributed
object storage. They are both targeted for archiving files and lack
sharing features. Enigma [33, 34] is the closest to our approach
in that it uses the blockchain for access control and enables shar-
ing of off-chain stored data. However, Enigma stores data access
logs within the blockchain, without addressing the consequential
scalability issues. Moreover, their system does not accommodate
for IoT stream data (not satisfing R3). Our approach is inspired by
the above approaches, however, our focus on IoT data leads to a
number of important design differences.
IoT Storage. A few of our design decisions regarding IoT data
streams are inspired by Bolt [13]. Bolt presents chunking of IoT
data for performance gain and protects confidentiality of chunks.
However, Bolt relies on the cloud-centric model (does not address
R1). “The Cloud is Not Enough" [32] discusses the pitfalls of the
cloud-centric IoT and advocates a data-centric approach. They leave
concrete system proposals for future work.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the primary design of a distributed
secure data storage system targeted for the Internet of Things. Our
system allows for fine-grained access control and sharing of time-
series sensor data of various IoT applications. Initial performance
evaluation results are promising and show a moderate overhead
due to our system. We are currently in the process of finalizing
a complete reference implementation of our system and building
several IoT applications on top of it.
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